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Proposals to Reinstate the Voluntary Recognition Bar and 
Rein in Captive Audience Speeches: A Rationale for Change 
at the National Labor Relations Board 
NORA L. MACEY* 
In their excellent articles, Professors Secunda, Moore, and Bales provide 
thoughtful analyses of two much-debated issues that arise under the National Labor 
Relations Board’s (NLRB) authority to oversee the processes for employee 
selection of an exclusive bargaining representative. Professor Secunda analyzes 
captive audience speeches, and Professors Moore and Bales take on voluntary 
recognition agreements. Both articles make valuable additions to the scholarly 
work on these controversial issues and persuasively argue for changes in the 
Board’s approach. 
My perspective comes from my thirty-plus years representing unions in the 
labor management field. During that time, I have witnessed growing dissatisfaction 
with the Board’s election procedures from the union side.1 This dissatisfaction has 
been fueled by increasingly difficult organizing campaigns and a perceived 
inability of Board processes to correct what unions perceive to be the worst abuses 
by employers in organizing situations. The processes themselves, through layers of 
review and appeals, can so drag out any resolution of the representation issue that 
even a “successful” election, upheld by the courts, often results in no contract and 
no representation.2 In reaction, many unions have abandoned Board procedures 
altogether in favor of direct pressure on employers to voluntarily recognize a union 
based on authorization cards showing majority support for union representation.3 
Educated by these experiences, most union-side commentators would generally 
commend the efforts and analyses offered by Professors Secunda, Moore, and 
Bales. 
Rather than re-tread ground already admirably covered by others,4 my 
comments will attempt to look with a wider lens at the Board as an institution and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 * Of Counsel, Macey Swanson and Allman. The author would like to thank Jeffrey A. 
Macey of the same firm for his valuable assistance in preparing these comments. Special 
thanks to Professor Kenneth Dau-Schmidt and the Indiana University Maurer School of Law 
for inviting me to participate in this Symposium. [Note: This Article was current with 
respect to Board decisions at the time of its submission on August 23, 2011. Significant 
relevant decisions issued after submission are noted below.] 
 1. For scholarly articles cataloguing union-side concerns, see James J. Brudney, 
Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 
IOWA L. REV. 819, 831 & n.57 (2005); Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American 
Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527 (2002). See also Wilma B. Liebman, Decline and 
Disenchantment: Reflections on the Aging of the National Labor Relations Board, 28 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 569, 570 & nn.6–12 (2007) for an insider’s view of the 
diminishing effectiveness of NLRB procedures over time. 
 2. See Brudney, supra note 1, at 819, 831 & n.57. 
 3. See id. at 825–31. 
 4. See, e.g., id. at 831–35; Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in 
Administrative Law Exile: Problems with Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for 
Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2060–61 (2009); see also Samuel Estreicher, Improving the 
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consider whether there are ways for the Board to make the changes in Board law 
and procedures advocated in these papers in a way that enhances, rather than 
undermines, Board credibility and effectiveness. Although labor management 
relations has recently taken on a winner-takes-all combativeness, it is worth 
considering how changes to the law can be made within the framework of labor 
peace through collective bargaining, the goal behind the passage of the Wagner Act 
in 1935.5 The goal of these comments is to consider the balance between precedent 
and change by focusing not only on what changes are appropriate, but also on the 
importance of articulating why each change is needed and how the change can best 
be effected consistent with the Board’s important role in the administration of the 
Act. 
I. A RATIONALE FOR CHANGE 
Evolution in implementation of the National Labor Relations Act (“the Act”) is 
inevitable and necessary, and anticipated by the Act itself.6 If, however, changes in 
Board law are perceived as arbitrary, erratic, and politically motivated, the Board 
and the labor management community both suffer. One problem can be a loss of 
predictability. Labor management relations are heavily regulated and depend on 
stability. The parties need to be able to conform their conduct to discernible legal 
standards.7 This is particularly true when the parties are negotiating a collective 
bargaining agreement intended to regulate their conduct over a period of years.  
Another negative consequence of perceived Board arbitrariness is an increased 
transfer of key decision making from the Board to the federal courts. Although 
Board decisions are entitled to deference based on the Board’s expertise,8 appellate 
court judges may be less likely to accord full deference to Board rules that appear 
to change from term to term based on the identity of the Board members and not on 
changed realities in the workplace.9 In the end, if appellate deference weakens due 
                                                                                                                 
Administration of the National Labor Relations Act Without Statutory Change, 25 A.B.A. J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 3–4 (2009). 
 5. See Wagner-Connery Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006)). For a discussion of the philosophical 
underpinnings of the Wagner Act, see Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union 
Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 501–07 (1993). 
 6. See American Cyanamid Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 909, 911 (1961) (“The Board must hold 
fast to the objectives of the statute using an empirical approach to adjust its decisions to the 
evolving realities of industrial progress and the reflection of that change in organizations of 
employees.”). 
 7. Liebman, supra note 1, at 587. 
 8. See, e.g., NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 787 (1990) (“We 
will uphold a Board rule as long as it is rational and consistent with the Act, even if we 
would have formulated a different rule had we sat on the Board.” (citation omitted)). 
 9. See Local 777, Democratic Union Org. Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 869 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978) (finding Board decision was entitled to little deference based on history of “ad 
hoc and inconsistent judgments—in which the only determinative elements seems [sic] to be 
the composition of the NLRB panel”); Paul M. Secunda, Politics Not as Usual: Inherently 
Destructive Conduct, Institutional Collegiality, and the National Labor Relations Board, 32 
FL. ST. U. L. REV. 51, 54 n.11 (2004) (noting that “Board decisions driven by political 
considerations” undermine the Board’s claim to expertise). See generally Liebman, supra 
2012] A RATIONALE FOR CHANGE 179 
 
 
to a lack of Board credibility, the rules governing employer and union conduct will 
be determined by federal judges and not by the Board. Federal judges have very 
little experience, much less expertise, in the day-to-day concepts of unit 
determinations, representation proceedings, organizing and picketing, recognition 
and contract bars, bad faith bargaining, and the myriad other issues regulated by 
Board decisions. 
Observers believe that the current Board majority will try to correct the 
perceived errors of the “Bush Board,” reinstate key decisions of the “Clinton 
Board,” and, time and opportunity permitting, provide positive rulings on issues 
that will promote collective bargaining and employee rights.10 Anticipated priorities 
for the current Board include increasing the classes of individuals covered by the 
Act,11 expanding concepts of lawful protected activity,12 expanding employee and 
union access to twenty-first century methods of communication,13 and making the 
road to union representation more open.14 The respective proposals of Professor 
Secunda and Professors Moore and Bales for restrictions on employer captive 
audience speeches and robust card check recognition fit within this broad agenda. 
If the Act contemplates that Board law will change over time, the Board must 
decide when change is warranted.15 Two strong grounds for overruling past 
precedent are (1) significant changes in the workplace and (2) negative experiences 
under existing rules. These two rationales may overlap. Changes in technology, 
particularly in how work gets done and in how employers and workers 
communicate, are making old ways of thinking about labor management issues 
obsolete.16 At the same time, Board members have the opportunity to observe 
                                                                                                                 
note 1, at 587 n.124.  
 10. See Tanja L. Thompson & R. Bradley Mokros, As the Pendulum Swings: The Role 
of Precedent in National Labor Relations Board Decisions, 2009 A.B.A. SEC. LAB. & EMP. 
L. ANN. CLE CONF. 1.  
 11. See, for example, New York University, 356 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (Oct. 25, 2010), in 
which the Board ordered an evidentiary hearing on petition for election by graduate students 
who perform teaching duties, indicating the Board’s willingness to reconsider its holding in 
Brown University, 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004), that graduate assistants are not employees. See 
also Kan. City Repertory Theatre, 356 N.L.R.B. No. 28 (Nov. 16, 2010) (on-call musicians 
are covered employees); Pac. Coast M.S. Indus. Co., 355 N.L.R.B. No. 226 (Sept. 30, 2010) 
(team leaders are employees not supervisors); Saint Barnabas Hosp., 355 N.L.R.B. No. 39 
(June 3, 2010) (medical interns are employees). 
 12. See, e.g., Eliason & Knuth of Ariz., Inc., 355 N.L.R.B. No. 159 (Aug. 27, 2010) 
(union’s stationary display of banners near secondary employer’s job site is lawful).  
 13. See, e.g., J & R Flooring, Inc., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 9, at *2 (Oct. 22, 2010); see 
generally Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National Labor Relations Act in 
Cyberspace: Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2000). 
 14. See, e.g., Dana Corp. (Dana II), 356 N.L.R.B. No. 49 (Dec. 6, 2010) (voluntary 
recognition of union based on majority card signing and negotiation of framework agreement 
prior to but conditional on proof of majority support for union is lawful). 
 15. For contrasting views of the role of precedent and change by representatives of 
management and labor, see Thompson & Mokros, supra note 10, at 1–4, 23–24, and Michael 
T. Anderson, Why Bad Law Lasts Forever: The Consequences of Censoring Charging 
Parties, 2009 A.B.A. SEC. LABOR & EMP. L. ANN. CLE CONF. 1, 3–5. 
 16. Malin & Perritt, supra note 13, at 11. 
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situations where old rules applied in a new work setting are no longer achieving 
their intended results. 
The Board has for many years followed the practice of developing rules for 
interpreting and applying the Act through Board decisions, in the context of live 
disputes and real facts. Historically, rulings in specific cases have been the 
mechanism for changing Board rules.17 Alternatives to case-by-case overruling of 
past decisions exist, and each of these alternatives has its advantages and 
drawbacks. 
Some observers have proposed that the Obama Board expand the use of its rule-
making power under section 6 of the Act as an alternative to announcing new 
Board rules in case decisions.18 Although the Board has not often used this 
mechanism to develop substantive rules,19 the labor management bar is accustomed 
to the Department of Labor’s use of rulemaking to provide guidance for compliance 
with important laws like the Fair Labor Standards Act20 and the Labor Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act.21 Rulemaking would allow the Board to regulate 
important labor management issues comprehensively, rather than piecemeal 
through case-by-case adjudication. The process of rulemaking institutionalizes a 
comment process with input from all constituencies, which could lead to more 
workable regulatory frameworks and improved buy-in from both sides. 
Some obvious disadvantages to the use of rulemaking have impeded movement 
in that direction.22 The rule-making process can be time consuming. The Board has 
competing demands because of its adjudicatory functions, demands that increased 
as a result of the Supreme Court decision in New Process Steel, which required the 
Board to reconsider decisions that had been previously disposed of by the two-
member Board.23 Another problem with Board rulemaking is the potential threat of 
congressional de-funding, which derailed Board efforts at rulemaking under then-
Chairman William Gould, when the Board proposed a rule favoring single-location 
bargaining units.24  
Falling back on traditional Board practice, the Obama Board could follow the 
opposite path to rulemaking and shape the law through fact-based determinations in 
individual cases. Under this process, the Board would not expressly overrule prior 
                                                                                                                 
 
 17. Thompson & Mokros, supra note 10, at 1 (citing Auciello Iron Works v. NLRB, 517 
U.S. 781, 787–88 (1996)). 
 18. See Estreicher, supra note 4, at 12–13. 
 19. Id. at 12. The Board’s last successful substantive rulemaking occurred in 1989 with 
the adoption of rules designating appropriate health care bargaining units for acute care 
hospitals. Thompson & Mokros, supra note 10, at 4 n.18. The rules were approved in 
American Hospital Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606 (1991). Id. at 4. 
 20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2006). 
 21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401–531 (2006). 
 22. See additional discussion of Board rule-making disadvantages in James J. Brudney, 
Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB’s Uncertain Future, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 221 
(2005). 
 23. New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2639 (2010). 
 24. Estreicher, supra note 4, at 13 (citing Joan Flynn, “Expertness for What?” The 
Gould Years at the NLRB and the Irrepressible Myth of the “Independent” Agency, 52 
ADMIN. L. REV. 465, 501–02 & nn.151–52 (2000)).  
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decisions but would use fact-based analysis in deciding cases to limit the 
application of prior decisions or create exceptions to existing rules. This approach 
plays to the Board’s strengths and can produce fair results in many cases without 
regard to the “rule” that the Board follows. For this reason, parties may be more 
satisfied with results in individual cases, courts would have fewer issues to review, 
and the Board could achieve generally fair results with less appearance that its 
decisions are politically motivated. 
But this kind of case-by-case decision making does not always work well in a 
highly regulated sector like labor management relations. Case-by-case decision 
making is less predictable and can lead to less protection for statutory rights than 
bright-line rules.25 Because both sides in labor relations are prone to pushing the 
envelope, the absence of clear rules is likely to lead to more litigation and review at 
every level. Still, the Obama Board may decide to choose its battles strategically, 
overturning decisions of the Bush Board in some areas and limiting them through 
case-by-case decision making in others.26 
Finally, the Board can achieve important objectives through its authority under 
section 9 of the Act to enforce “laboratory conditions”27 for union elections and 
through its remedial power under NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.28 to issue a 
bargaining order as a remedy for egregious employer misconduct affecting an 
election.29 The NLRB General Counsel’s independent authority over investigations, 
issuance of complaints, and selection of remedies can be used to address 
dysfunctions in traditional Board election processes. Acting General Counsel 
Solomon has not hesitated to use the powers of the Office of General Counsel to 
address employer misconduct in organizing campaigns. For instance, Solomon has 
adopted procedures for early identification of appropriate cases, strategic use of 
10(j) injunctions, and more effective remedies to protect the integrity of the 
election process in the face of the most serious violations of employee rights.30 
                                                                                                                 
 
 25. Anderson, supra note 15, at 11–15. 
 26. A Board practice against overruling precedent with fewer than three votes in favor 
may also lead to fact-based decisions instead of outright overruling of precedent. See 
Hacienda Resort Hotel & Casino, 355 N.L.R.B. No. 154, at 2 n.1 (Aug. 27, 2010) (collecting 
cases). See generally Letter from Wilma B. Liebman, Chairman, NLRB, to Phil Roe, 
Chairman, House of Representatives, Subcomm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 
Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce (Feb. 25, 2011), 
http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/379/chairmancommitteeletter.pdf.  
 27. See General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948). 
 28. 395 U.S. 575 (1969). 
 29. Estreicher, supra note 4, at 14–15, 19–20. 
 30. General Counsel Memorandum No. 11-01 from Lafe E. Solomon, Acting NLRB 
General Counsel, to All Regional Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers (Dec. 
20, 2010), http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458042ba39; General Counsel 
Memorandum No. 10-07 from Lafe E. Solomon, Acting NLRB General Counsel, to All 
Regional Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers (Sept. 30, 2010), 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45803afc6f. The first contract initiative of 
former General Counsel Ronald Meisberg similarly made use of the powers of that office to 
remedy practices that undermined core purposes of the Act. See General Counsel 
Memorandum No. 07-08 from Ronald Meisberg, NLRB General Counsel, to All Regional 
Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers (May 29, 2007), 
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While these initiatives can have a powerful impact in deterring misconduct and 
shaping the Board’s agenda, the General Counsel has no power to change 
underlying Board law. 
II. OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING CARD CHECK AND CAPTIVE AUDIENCE ISSUES 
With these strategies in mind, we can begin to analyze existing and projected 
Board approaches to the issues raised by Professor Secunda and Professors Moore 
and Bales. 
A. Voluntary Recognition and the Dana Decision  
The Obama Board has already taken steps to reconsider the 2007 decision in 
Dana Corp.,31 which restricted voluntary card check recognition by deferring any 
recognition bar until an approved notice of recognition and description of rights is 
posted and until employees or rival unions have an opportunity to file a petition for 
a Board-supervised election challenging the majority status of the recognized 
union. The 2007 Dana decision overturned a forty-year-old Board precedent in 
Keller Plastics Eastern,32 which accorded a voluntarily recognized union a 
“reasonable time” to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with the employer 
free from election challenges to its majority status.33 
In August 2010, the Board, in two cases decided under the Dana framework, 
issued a formal Notice and Invitation to File Briefs,34 asking the parties and amici 
to address several questions, including:  
• What are their experiences under Dana? 
• In what ways has Dana furthered or hindered employee choice? 
• In what ways has Dana furthered or de-stabilized bargaining? 
• Should Dana apply in cases of “after-acquired” neutrality/card check clauses 
or in merger cases? 
The Board’s Notice signaled its intention to rely on its own experience in reviewing 
1000 requests for voluntary recognition in the three years since the Dana decision 
and the experience of parties to voluntary recognition agreements to determine 
whether the Dana procedures “have advanced or hindered” the statutory goals of 
employee free choice and collective bargaining.35 
In their analysis of the “failure of the political model of industrial democracy,” 
Professors Moore and Bales persuasively argue that the assumptions underlying the 
Dana decision are unsupported by industrial experience. Their article cites studies 
which show that fears by the Dana majority about the power of “group pressure” 
are unsupported, based on evidence that employer pressure on employees to oppose 
                                                                                                                 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/ 09031d4580031365. 
 31. 351 N.L.R.B. 434 (2007). After this article was submitted, the Board in Lamons 
Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72 (Aug. 26, 2011), reversed the 2007 decision in Dana 
Corp., restoring the voluntary recognition bar. 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72 at *10. 
 32. 157 N.L.R.B. 583 (1966). 
 33. Id. at 587. 
 34. Notice and Invitation to File Briefs, NLRB (Aug. 31, 2010), https://www.nlrb.gov/ 
sites/default/files/documents/236/rite-aid_lamons-gasket_notice_ conf.pdf. 
 35. Id. at 2.  
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unionization is “significantly greater” than pressure from co-workers, and that any 
pressure exerted by union organizers was no greater during card signing campaigns 
than during an election.36 The Dana majority also expressed concern that the 
quality of information provided to employees, especially on the disadvantages of 
unionization, is diminished in card signing campaigns, but Professors Moore and 
Bales find the empirical evidence on employee access to pro-employer views 
somewhat mixed. Professors Moore and Bales point out, as a matter of law and 
policy, that there is a statutory right for employers to express their opinions, but 
there is no statutory requirement that employees hear that message. More tellingly, 
they point out that the anti-union message is readily available to employees from a 
number of sources and in a number of formats, absent an employer campaign 
against the union. They add that the employees’ access to the anti-union message 
during a card signing campaign is comparable to the opportunities unions have to 
communicate a pro-union message under the current system.37 These and other key 
points in their textured analysis are responsive to the Board’s expressed concern 
that reconsideration of Dana be based on the reality of experience in the workplace. 
The Board’s Notice of Hearing and Request for Briefs showed the Board 
majority’s consciousness of its responsibility to articulate a principled basis for 
reconsideration of Dana—in other words, a reason to re-examine the kinds of 
arguments made by Professors Moore and Bales and by those with opposite views. 
The Board’s broad solicitation of briefs sought information on the experience of the 
labor management community under the Dana framework, especially in key areas 
of the law such as protecting employee choice, collective bargaining, and 
continuity of representation. Although the Dana decision is less than four years old, 
the Board expressed its view that the number of cases decided under the Dana 
framework is sufficient to allow the Board to now make some evaluation of its 
impact.38 This is especially true because Dana changed rules and practices that had 
been in effect for more than forty years. It seems reasonable for the Board to decide 
to look at whether the Dana framework limiting voluntary recognition is yielding 
better results than the longstanding rules and practices upended by the Dana 
decision. 
Professors Moore and Bales, like many commentators, focus on voluntary 
recognition issues in the context of an organizing drive against an unorganized 
employer. But a complete consideration of these issues requires at least some 
discussion of voluntary recognition in the context of established bargaining 
relationships, including successorship, sales, and transfers of work or employees. 
Unions and employers in the manufacturing sector have been negotiating 
provisions intended to encourage union cooperation during workplace dislocation 
in exchange for job security, continued union representation, and assured 
continuation of core benefits under existing collective bargaining agreements. To 
                                                                                                                 
 
 36. James Y. Moore & Richard A. Bales, Elections, Neutrality Agreements, and Card 
Checks: The Failure of the Political Model of Industrial Democracy, 87 IND. L.J. 147, 159 
(2012). 
 37. Id. at 159–60 (citing Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, NLRB Elections Versus Card 
Check Campaigns: Results of a Worker Survey, 62 INDUS. & LAB. REL REV. 157, 170–71 
(2009)); Brudney, supra note 1, at 848, 855–56. 
 38. Notice and Invitation, supra note 34, at 2. 
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achieve their joint objectives, the parties to these agreements need guidance from 
the Board on the proper scope of these agreements. 
In its recent Dana II39 decision, the Board provided some needed guidance. 
Dana II clarified Board law to allow broad, though not unlimited, rights for parties 
in existing collective bargaining relationships to negotiate neutrality/card check 
agreements governing unorganized facilities, which include a basic framework for 
collective bargaining. In so doing, it distinguished its longstanding decision in 
Majestic Weaving,40 which held that an employer violated section 8(a)(2) by 
recognizing and negotiating a complete collective bargaining agreement with a 
union prior to and contingent upon the union’s subsequent proof of majority 
support. The Dana II decision refused to read Majestic Weaving as providing “a per 
se rule that negotiation with a union ‘over substantive terms and conditions of 
employment’ is unlawful if it occurs before the union has attained majority 
support.”41 Instead, it found controlling distinctions between the facts of the two 
cases, in particular the fact that Majestic Weaving granted exclusive recognition to 
the union before proof of majority status, while Dana expressly withheld 
recognition until majority support was established.42 
Also in contrast to Dana, Majestic Weaving negotiated a complete collective 
bargaining agreement, subject only to execution, while the Letter of Agreement 
between Dana and the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement 
Workers of America (UAW) created a bare framework for future bargaining 
requiring extended substantive negotiations before it could be executed.43 The 
Board also noted that, in Majestic Weaving, accompanying unfair labor practices 
included supervisor solicitation of union support, which supported the finding of a 
section 8(a)(2) violation.44 
Although the dissenting Board member asserted that the Dana II decision 
effectively overruled Majestic Weaving,45 the Board majority was explicit in its 
view that the Dana II decision instead distinguished Majestic Weaving based on the 
facts before the Board.46 In so doing, the Board declined to adopt a bright-line rule 
governing permissible pre-recognition negotiations.47  
From my perspective, the Board could do more to enable labor and management 
to effectively bargain in these unsettled times. A reversal of the Dana decision and 
restoration of the full recognition bar for voluntary recognition would help parties 
                                                                                                                 
 
 39. 356 N.L.R.B. No. 49 (Dec. 6, 2010).  
 40. 147 N.L.R.B. 859 (1964), enforcement denied 355 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1966). 
 41. 356 N.L.R.B. No. 49 at *6. 
 42. Id. at *8. 
 43. Id. at *6–7.  
 44. Id. at *6. 
 45. Id. at *10. 
 46. Id. at *9.  
 47. Id. at *4 (“As the Supreme Court has observed, there are issues of labor law where 
the ‘nature of the problem, as revealed by unfolding variant situations,’ requires ‘an 
evolutionary process for its rational response, not a quick, definitive formula as a 
comprehensive answer.’” (citing Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 477 U.S. 556, 575 (1978))). 
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to negotiate useful transition agreements.48 A return to the successor bar rule under 
Saint Elizabeth Manor49 would be of even more help to unions and represented 
workers who would benefit from stability in bargaining and union representation in 
spite of instability of ownership.50 We will have to await decisions on these issues 
to see whether the Board will adopt the kind of bright-line rule in those cases that it 
eschewed in Dana II. 
Whatever approach the Board adopts, the idea of developing a set of guidelines 
to fairly regulate labor management agreements, and particularly bargaining on the 
issue of continuing recognition and representation, would make life more 
predictable and allow parties to negotiate with some certainty for a system they can 
live with. 
B. Captive Audience Speeches and Section 8(c) 
Professor Secunda is a frequent writer and speaker on the issue of captive 
audience speeches. His article canvasses the history of court and Board protection 
of employer rights, the countervailing authority supporting limitations on the 
coercive nature of the contemporary captive audience speech, and the impact on 
fairness of Board elections given the current imbalance between employers’ and 
unions’ relative access to employees and ability to effectively convey their 
messages. 
Unlike the voluntary recognition issues, which the Obama Board has taken steps 
to address, the limitations on captive audience practices recommended by Professor 
Secunda have not yet been addressed by the current Board. This may be partly 
because limitations on captive audience speeches implicate broadly read employer 
free speech rights under section 8(c), and Board law has long recognized 
employers’ rights to engage in captive audience speeches as a regular part of their 
response to union organizing. Professor Secunda presents a strong argument for 
reframing the Board’s view, and the reframing may happen if the appropriate case 
arises in the near term. But for now, no change in substantive law on captive 
audience speeches is anticipated. 
It is more likely, as Professor Secunda suggests, that any change will occur 
around the edges, through the Board’s authority under General Shoe to assure 
“laboratory conditions” for Board elections,51 and outside the context of unfair 
labor practices where the 8(c) protections for employer speech apply. Or, if the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 48. Since submission of this Article, the Board has done exactly that in Lamons -Gasket 
Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72 (Aug. 26, 2011). See note 31, supra. 
 49. On the same day as the Board’s Dana notice, it also invited briefs by parties and 
amici on the successor bar issue. See Saint Elizabeth Manor, 329 N.L.R.B. 341 (1999), 
overruled by MV Transportation, 337 N.L.R.B. 770 (2002). After this Article was submitted, 
the Board overruled MV Transportation in UGL-UNICCO, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (Aug. 26, 
2011), restoring the successor bar.  
 50. The issue of employer withdrawal of recognition based on “good faith doubt” of 
union majority status (and without invoking the Board’s election mechanism) is also part of 
the equation. See Rik Lineback, Comments on Proposed Changes to Captive Audience 
Speech Rules and Use of Card Checks, 87 IND. L.J. 165, 172–73 (2012). 
 51. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126 (1948). 
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current Board sees an appropriate case, it may consider setting some outer limits 
for employer conduct associated with captive audience speeches, either as an unfair 
labor practice or as objectionable conduct warranting a new election.52 Professor 
Secunda suggests that the standards for employer conduct in polling may be 
adapted to limit employer conduct in connection with captive audience speeches. 
This is a creative approach and may find appeal with the Board because the 
proposal calls for a surgical extension of existing law to curb coercive effects of 
captive audience speeches rather than a wholesale rejection of longstanding law 
broadly protecting employers’ use of this weapon. 
Another approach to captive audience speeches could be through the General 
Counsel’s supervision of elections and selection of appropriate remedies. The 
Acting General Counsel’s 10(j) initiative focuses on curbing coercive employer 
tactics in the pre-election period, with an emphasis on quick remedies for 
discriminatory discharges.53 As part of this comprehensive approach to curing the 
effects of employer misconduct in this context, the Acting General Counsel issued 
a second memo in December 2010 on effective remedies.54 
Under the GC Memorandum, regional offices are directed to include enhanced 
communication remedies as part of their 10(j) submissions and in complaints based 
on multiple unfair labor practices, including discharges and “serious ancillary 
unfair labor practices.”55 In cases where a Region determines that the impact of 
employer unfair labor practices cannot be mitigated by traditional and enhanced 
communication remedies, the Region is directed to submit a request for additional 
remedies which may include: 
granting a union access to nonwork areas during employees’ nonwork 
time; giving a union notice of, and equal time and facilities for the 
union to respond to any address made by the company regarding the 
issue of representation; and affording the union the right to deliver a 
speech to employees at an appropriate time prior to any Board 
election.56  
Consistent with many of Professor Secunda’s recommendations, these remedies 
respond to the effects of employer captive audience speeches, when accompanied 
by other serious unfair labor practices, by expanding access for unions rather than 
restricting employer speech protected by section 8(c). But, contrary to Professor 
Secunda’s view that captive audience speeches are inherently coercive, these access 
remedies are reserved only for those cases where “an employer makes multiple 
                                                                                                                 
 
 52. See Estreicher, supra note 4, at 14–16 (advocating expanded access for union 
organizers to counterbalance employer captive audience speeches as an extension of 
Peerless Plywood, 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953) and Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 
1236 (1966)). 
 53. General Counsel Memorandum No. 10-07, supra note 30. 
 54. General Counsel Memorandum No. 11-01, supra note 30. 
 55. Enhanced remedies include orders that the NLRB Notice be read publicly to all 
employees, that unions be given access to employer bulletin boards, and that unions have 
expanded access to Excelsior lists of employees names and addresses. 
 56. Id. at 10. 
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unlawful captive audience speeches57 or where the employer is a recidivist and has 
shown a proclivity to violate the Act.”58 
The Board’s most recent rule-making initiative, revising Board election 
procedures, may indirectly impact the use of captive audience speeches by 
somewhat shortening the pre-election period and by enhancing union ability to 
directly contact employees.59 The Board, with Member Hayes dissenting, proposes 
to amend its rules and procedures governing Board-supervised elections, to require 
electronic filing and transmission of election petitions, notices, and voter lists; 
expand employee information included on Excelsior lists (including email 
addresses, where available); “streamline pre- and post-election procedures”; and 
reduce litigation.60 In spite of the concerns expressed in the Dissenting View of 
Member Hayes,61 any impact of these amended procedures on the effectiveness of 
employer captive audience speeches will be minimal in comparison to the more 
sweeping legal reforms recommended by Professor Secunda. 
Whatever further approaches the Board and General Counsel decide to pursue in 
this area, I agree with Professor Secunda’s prediction that the law governing 
captive audience speeches will be reshaped with a scalpel, rather than a buzz saw, 
and leave the basic legal landscape permitting captive audience speeches in place. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 57. Unlawful captive audience speeches are those that include threats and promises 
unprotected by section 8(c) or which occur within the twenty-four-hour period prior to an 
election which is insulated under In re Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).  
 58. General Counsel Memorandum No. 11-01, supra note 30, at 10–11. 
 59. See NLRB Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 76 Fed. Reg. 36812 (proposed June 22, 
2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 101–03). 
 60. Proposed Amendments to NLRB Election Rules and Regulations Fact Sheet, NAT’L 
LAB. REL. BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/Proposed%20Amendments. 
 61. 76 Fed. Reg. at 36831. 
       
